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Abstrat We onsider a dynami Stakelberg game theoreti model of the
oordination of soial and private interests (SPICE-model) of resoure allo-
ation in marketing networks. The dynamis of ontrolled system desribes
an interation of the members of a target audiene (basi agents) that leads
to a hange of their opinions (ost of buying the goods and servies of rms
ompeting on a market). An interation of the rms (inuene agents) is
formalized as their dierential game in strategi form. The payo funtional
of eah rm inludes two terms: the summary opinion of the basi agents
with onsideration of their marketing osts (a ommon interest of all rms),
and the inome from investments in a private ativity. The latter inome is
desribed by a linear funtion. The rms exert their inuene not to all basi
agents but only to the members of strong subgroups of the inuene digraph
(opinion leaders). The opinion leaders determine the stable nal opinions of
all members of the target audiene. A oordinating prinipal determines the
rms' marketing budgets and maximizes the summary opinion of the basi
agents with onsideration of the alloated resoures. The Nash equilibrium
in the game of inuene agents and the Stakelberg equilibrium in a general
hierarhial game of the prinipal with them are found. It is proved that the
value of opinion of a basi agent is the same for all inuene agents and the
prinipal. It is also proved that the inuene agents assign less resoures for
the marketing eorts than the prinipal would like.
Keywords: dierential Stakelberg games, marketing, opinion ontrol on
networks, resoure alloation.
1. Introdution
Models of inuene and opinion ontrol on networks are widespread in the lit-
erature in the last several deades (Chkhartishvili, Gubanov and Novikov, 2019;
Jakson, 2008). The approah most lose to the authors' one is presented in the
papers (Sedakov and Zhen, 2019; Zhen, 2019). In those models a network is de-
sribed by a weighted direted graph in whih the verties represent the members
of the network (basi agents), and the weights of the ars reet an intensity of
their mutual inuene. The basi agents have their opinions about an issue whih
an hange in time due to the network interation. External inuene agents an
impat the basi agents in their own interests. We suppose the following. First, it
is rational to exert ontrol impat not to all basi agents but only to the members
⋆
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of strong subgroups of the inuene digraph (opinion leaders). It is known that the
opinion leaders determine the stable nal opinions of all basi agents. Seond, we
onsider marketing networks in whih the opinions of basi agents are their osts
of buying of the goods and servies providing by rms ompeting on a market (in-
uene agents), and ontrol variables of the inuene agents are their marketing
eorts direted to the opinion leaders (Agieva, Korolev and Ougolnitsky, 2019).
Models of oordination of the soial and private interests, inluding their dy-
nami formulation, are studied in the publi eonomis (Long, 2010). In those mod-
els it is supposed that eah agent divides his eorts between a private ativity and
the prodution of a good whih is ommon for all agents. In turn, the agent's payo
is a sum of the inome from his private ativity and his share in the utility from the
prodution of the ommon good. The author's formulation of the models of oordi-
nation of soial and private resoures (SPICE-models) is given in (Gorbaneva, 2019),
and some examples of the appliation of SPICE-models in dierent problem domains
are desribed in (Anophenko and others, 2019a; Anophenko and others, 2019b;
Sukhinov, Ougolnitsky and Usov, 2020; Ugol'nitskii and Usov, 2020).
An important aspet of the ontrol in omplex systems onsists in the evaluation
of a degree of oordination between the ative agents. The most known formulation
is the problem of ineieny of equilibria when the global maximal value of the
funtion of soial welfare is ompared with its value in the worst of Nash equilibria
in a game of the agents (Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos and Vazirani, 2007).
This paper is based on the mentioned streams of researh and makes the fol-
lowing ontribution. We onsider a hierarhial dynami SPICE-model of resoure
alloation in a marketing network. The dynamis of opinions of the basi agents
(members of the target audiene) is determined by their interation and marketing
eorts of several ompeting rms (inuene agents) that form the lower ontrol
level. The payo funtional of eah rm inludes two terms: the summary opinion
of all basi agents with onsideration of the marketing ost (a ommon interest of
all inuene agents), and the inome from investments in a private ativity. The
latter inome is desribed by a linear funtion. It is assumed that in the stage of
analysis of the network the members of its strong subgroups (opinion leaders) are
already found, and the rms exert marketing inuene only on them. On the upper
ontrol level a oordinating prinipal is situated. The prinipal alloates marketing
budgets between the rms (inuene agents) for the maximization of the summary
opinion of the basi agents. The unique Nash equilibrium in the game of inuene
agents in strategi form and the unique Stakelberg equilibrium in the game of the
prinipal with them are found. The evaluation of the degree of oordination be-
tween the prinipal and the inuene agents is made by means of a speial system
ompatibility index (Sukhinov, Ougolnitsky and Usov, 2020).
In Setion 2 we desribe the SPICE-model of resoure alloation in marketing
networks, preise its speis, and haraterize the used methods. In Setion 3 the
Nash equilibrium in the dierential game of inuene agents in strategi form is
built. In Setion 4 the solution of the dierential Stakelberg game between the
prinipal and the inuene agents is built. In setion 5 the system ompatibility in-
dex is alulated. Setion 6 onludes and ontains the diretions of future researh.
10 Movlatkhan T. Agieva, Olga I. Gorbaneva
2. Dynamial Hierarhial SPICE-Model
The hierarhial dynami SPICE-model of resoure alloation in a marketing
network has the form:














 dt→ max, (1)



































aljxl(t), xj(0) = xj0, j = 1, . . . , n, (5)
sij =
{
1, bij > 0,
0, bij = 0.
(6)
Thus, (1)-(6) is a dierential Stakelberg game of the prinipal with several inuene
agents (rms). Here n is a number of basi agents (a number of target audiene),
m  a number of inuene agents (ompeting rms), R  a total marketing budget
of the leader, T  a length of the game, J0, Ji  the payo funtionals of the leader
and the inuene agents respetively, ri(t)  a marketing budget alloated to the
i-th inuene agent by the leader in the moment of time t, xj(t)  an opinion of
the j-th basi agent in the moment t (ost of buying of goods and servies), uij(t) 
expenditures of the i-th inuene agent for the marketing impat (advertizing and
so on) to the j-th basi agent in the moment t, aij  a oeient of inuene of
the i-th basi agent to the j-th basi agent, bij  a oeient of inuene of the i-th
inuene agent to the j-th basi agent, δ denotes a disount fator, i.e. δ = e−ρ.
As dierent rms an exert inuene to dierent members of the strong subgroups,
we simply assume that if the i-th rm (inuene agent) does not impat to the
j-th basi agent then bij = 0, s
i
j haraterizes the onnetion of the i -th agent of
inuene and the j -th basi agent.
The Prinipal has at any instant of time t a value of resoures to be alloated
to the inuene agents. Eah of the agents reeives a value of resoures ri(t) that
is a ontinuous funtion ri(t) : [0, T ] → [0, R]. The budget onstraint means that∑m
i=1 ri(t) ≤ R. After reeiving the resoures ri(t) from the Prinipal the inuene
agents use them in private and ommon interests. The ommon interests are modeled
by the funtion uij(t) whih desribes the share of the i-th inuene agent's resoures
assigned for the marketing impat on the j-th basi agent at the moment t. The
ontinuous funtions uij(t) : [0, T ] → [0, ri(t)] are the strategies of the i-th inuene
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j(t) < ri(t). The marketing impat
inludes advertizing, speial ations, disounts, gifts, and so on.
A ommon (soial) interest of the inuene agents is modeled as maximization
of the summary opinion of the basi agents, and their private interests are repre-
sented by the inome from an ativity whih is not onerned with marketing eorts
(for example, the private investments). We used the linear funtions of the private
ativity, i.e. pi(x) = pi · x, where pi > 0 is a onstant value. In turn, the prini-
pal maximizes the summary opinion of all basi agents minus the ost of resoures
alloated to the rms.
The unique Nash equilibrium in the game of inuene agents in strategi form
and the unique Stakelberg equilibrium in the game of the prinipal with them are
found analytially by the Hamilton-Jaobi-Bellman equations.
3. Building the Nash Equilibrium in the Game of Inuene Agents


























































uij(t) = Ri(t) ≤ ri(t).






























)2 , and the expression Ri(t) =
∑
j:bij 6=0











is equal to zero and an be inserted























uij(t), as if b
i
j = 0 then u
i
j(t) = 0. We onsider the ase when
the produt of all bij is not equal to zero, otherwise the problem has no pratial
sense (there is no inuene).
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Equating in the left and right hand sides of the equation (9) the oeients at the
rst power of x, we reeive the following dierential equations for the oeients α:
ραij(t)− α′ij (t) = 1 +
n∑
l=1
αil(t)ajl, j = 1, 2, ..., n. (10)
Rewrite the system of equations (10) in the matrix form
α′j = (ρI −A)αj − ǫ, (11)
where A = {aij}i=1,2,...,n;j=1,2,...,n is the inuene matrix, αi  the olumn vetor
of the oeients αij , j = 1, 2, ..., n, I  the unit matrix, ǫ  n-dimensional olumn
vetor of units. System (11) is the same for all inuene agents, therefore α1j (t) =
= α2j (t) = ... = α
m
j (t) = αj(t) for any basi agent j = 1, 2, ..., n, and from this point
we will omit the supersript i of the oeients αj .
Solving the system of dierential equations (10), we reeive:
ᾱ = (ρI −A)−1ǫ,
α = e(ρI−A)tC + (ρI −A)−1ǫ.
The olumn vetor of the onstants of integration is found from the boundary
onditions:
α(T ) = 0,
therefore











Considering that αij(t) = α
k
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Choosing the maximal value of the right hand side of (7) in dependene of the sum
Ri(t), we have



































Let us all the amount αij(t) the opinion value of the j-th basi agent for the






i(t), the fator αij(t) is a weight oeient of the opinion




j (t) we reeive
Proposition 1. The opinion value of eah basi agent is the same for all inuene
agents.
Equating the onstant terms in the left and right hand sides of (9), we reeive the
dierential equation for βi:











+ piRi(t) +Ri(t). (14)

























































2 ≤ 4(1 + pk)2rk(t).
(15)
Thus, the maximal payo of the inuene agent is
max
uij ,1≤j≤n
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where the omponents αj(0), j = 1, 2, ..., n of the vetor α(0) are determined by the
expression (12), and Rk(τ), k = 1, 2, ...,m are determined by the expression (15).





























4. The Stakelberg Game of the Prinipal with the Inuene Agents
Let us move to the prinipal's problem (1)-(2),(5)-(6). The Hamilton-Jaobi-












































































































α0j (t)xj + β
0(t).
Let us show that α0j (t) = αj(t), j = 1, 2, ..., n , t ∈ [0, T ] . Equating in (17) the
oeients at the rst power of xj in the left and right hand sides, we reeive the
dierential equation for α0j(t):
α′0j (t)− ρα0j (t) +
n∑
l=1
α0l (t)ajl = −1,
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whih oinides with (10) for the same boundary onditions
α(T ) = 0,
therefore
α0j (t) = α
1
j (t) = ... = α
m
j (t) = αj(t), j = 1, 2, ..., n, t ∈ [0;T ]. (18)
Let us all α0j(t) the opinion value of the j-th basi agent for the prinipal. In the




j (t)xj + β
0(t) the fator α0j (t) is
the weight oeient of the opinion of the respetive basi agent. Thus, from the
ondition (18) we reeive
Proposition 2. The opinion value of eah basi agent is the same for all inuene
agents and the prinipal.



































































If the minimum is attained in the rst expression, the funtion dereases on ri(t),
and the optimal value of ri(t) is minimal. It is minimal if the expressions under the
sign of minimum are equal. Thus, the minimum is attained in the seond expression
or it is absent.











































Thus, the prinipal alloates to an inuene agent as many resoures as the latter
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and we reeive the following
Proposition 3. The inuene agents assign less resoures for the marketing eorts











then the prinipal alloates to eah agent the amount of resoures equal to (20).










answer is given by the onditional maximization of the expression (19). Maximizing
the right hand side of (19) by ri(t), i = 1, 2, ...,m with ondition
∑n




































, i = 1, 2, ...,m,

























)2R, i = 1, 2, ...,m.
Combining both expressions for ri(t) in the same formula, we reeive the nal
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Equating the onstant terms in the left and right hand sides of (19), we reeive the
dierential equation for β0(t) :




















































Thus, the maximal guaranteed payo of the prinipal is
max
ri,1≤i≤m







where the omponents αj(0), j = 1, 2, ..., n of the vetor α(0) are determined by the
expression (12), and f(τ) is determined by the expression (23).
5. System Compatibility Index









where the set NE(ri(t)) is the Nash equillibrium of the agents of inuene in re-
spone to the resoure amount ri(t).
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This index shows the measure of ompatability of system. The numerator of (25)
is the payo of the prinipal in the ase if the rms hoose the most unfavorable
for prinipal equilibrium strategies. The denumerator of (25) is the payo of the
prinipal in the ase if the rms hoose the most favorable for prinipal strategies.
It is evident that 0 ≤ SCI ≤ 1. A similar formula is used in the paper (Agieva,
Korolev and Ougolnitsky, 2019).
In our ase the set of equilibrium strategies of eah inuene agent given the
prinipal's strategy is a singleton, therefore, the numerator in (25) is equal to the
right hand side of the formula (24).
For the alulation of the denominator in the expression (25) let us assume that
eah inuene agent maximizes not his payo but the prinipal's payo given her








with onditions (4)-(6). This funtion is introdued for nding the inuene agent
stratigies whih maximize the payo funtion of the Centre.
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Equating the oeients at the rst power of x in the left and right hand sides of
(28), we reeive dierential equations for the oeients α:
α′ij (t)− ραij(t) +
n∑
l=1
αil(t)ajl = −1, (29)
oiniding with the equations (10) solved by the expression (12).
Choosing the maximal value of the right hand side of (28) in dependene on the
sum of Ri(t), we have
Ri(t) = ri(t),
that is natural beause the inuene agents are for the prinipal's payo instead















where αj(t), j = 1, 2, ..., n are the omponents of the vetor α(t) whih is determined
by the expression (12).
Let us move to the prinipal's problem (1)-(2),(5). The ondition (5) with on-



































































i=1 ri(t) ≤ R, ri(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ...,m.
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with ondition
∑m
i=1 ri(t) ≤ R, ri(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ...,m.
Let us show that α0j(t) = αj(t), j = 1, 2, ..., n, t ∈ T . Equating in (32) the
oeients at the rst power of xj in the left and right hand sides, we reeive the
dierential equation for α0j(t):
α′0j (t)− ρα0j (t) +
n∑
l=1
α0l (t)ajl = −1,
whih oinides with (10) for the same boundary onditions
α(T ) = 0,
therefore
α0j (t) = α
1
j (t) = ... = α
m
j (t) = αj(t), j = 1, 2, ..., n, t ∈ [0;T ]. (33)















































i=1 ri(t) ≤ R, ri(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ...,m. Notie that the non-










Thus, the prinipal is interested to alloate to eah inuene agent i the value of








then the prinipal alloates to eah inuene agent i the value of resoures (35). How









ing the right hand side of (34) by ri(t), i = 1, 2, ...,m with ondition
∑m
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)2R, i = 1, 2, ...,m.


































































































Equating the onstant terms in the left and right hand sides of (34), we reeive the
dierential equation for β0(t):










































































where ψ(t) is determined by the expression (37).
Thus, the denominator of the expression (25) maxy∈Y maxz∈Z J0(y, z), or the








where αj(0), j = 1, 2, ..., n , are determined by the formula (12), and ψ(τ) is deter-
mined by the expression (37).













Notie that the omplete system ompatibility is ahieved only if f(τ) = ψ(τ),






)2 ≤ 4R(1+pi)2 is true, and they lak resoures for the ommon
purpose.
6. Conlusion
We onsidered a dynami SPICE-model of resoure alloation in a marketing
network. The network inludes a oordinating prinipal that alloates resoures,
several inuene agents (ompeting rms), and basi agents whih form the target
audiene. The model represents a dierential Stakelberg game of the prinipal
with the inuene agents. In the ase of linear funtions of private inome of the
inuene agents we found analytially the unique Nash equilibrium in the game of
agents and Stakelberg equilibrium in the general game by means of the Hamilton-
Jaobi-Bellman equations. We proved that the opinion value of any basi agent is
equal for all inuene agents and the prinipal. Also we proved that the inuene
agents assign less resoures for the marketing eorts than the prinipal would like.
We plan to spread the reeived results to the funtions of private inome in more
general form. Besides, it seems rational to onsider in more details the rm's utility
from buying by the basi agents the goods and servies of this spei rm instead
of all rms in the totality.
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